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Abstract
This note gives a short proof that both fixed-fee and royalty licens-
ing under patent protection can always create higher R&D investment.
JEL classification: O32, O34, O38
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In Mukherjee (2006) (Henceforth MU), royalty licensing is introduced as a
regime under patent protection to always increase R&D investment irrespective
of the tournament effect, which is considered in Chowdhury (2005). Then we have
the following result for both fixed-fee and royalty licensing schemes
Proposition 1. Both fixed-fee and royalty licensing under patent protection can
always create higher R&D investment.
Proof. According to Wang (1998), fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holding firm
is inferior to royalty licensing when the cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic.
This result is implicitly implied in Rockett (1990), which considers both fixed-fee
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and royalty licensing and concludes that in equilibrium, fixed-fee is zero and only
output royalty is positive. MU already proves that royalty licensing under patent
protection may always induce higher R&D investment. Now, we need to show that
fixed-fee licensing also has this effect.
Fixed-fee licensing has a net profit transferred from the licensee (firm 2) to the
licenser (firm 1). The optimal level of fixed-fee charged by firm 1 should be the
amount that makes firm 2 indifferent between licensing and no licensing, which is
G(c′, c) = pi2(c′, c′)− pi2(c′, c) = pi1(c′, c′)− pi1(c, c′). (1)
As a result, the net profit transfer from the licensee to the licenser when license is
sold, yields the following payoff of firm 1 as
1
2
[
(p(c′,c′) − c′)q1(c′, c′) +G(c′, c)
]
+
1
2
[
(p(c′,c′) − c′)q1(c′, c′)−G(c′, c)
]− F
=
1
2
pi1(c′, c′) +
1
2
pi1(c′, c′)− F = pi1(c′, c′)− F. (2)
The fixed-fee G(c′, c˜) under no patent protection with licensing is calculated using
the same logic as Eq.(1), implying G(c′, c˜) = pi2(c′, c′) − pi2(c′, c˜) = pi1(c′, c˜) −
pi1(c′, c′). Consequently, the game matrices can be written as
Table 3.1 payoffs under no patent protection
R&D No R&D
R&D pi1(c′, c′)− F , pi2(c′, c′)− F pi1(c′, c′) +G(c′, c˜)− F , pi2(c′, c˜)
No R&D pi1(c˜, c′), pi2(c′, c′) +G(c˜, c′)− F pi(c, c), pi(c, c)
Table 4.1 payoffs under patent protection
R&D No R&D
R&D pi1(c′, c′)− F , pi2(c′, c′)− F pi1(c′, c′) +G(c′, c)− F ,
pi2(c′, c′)−G(c′, c)
No R&D pi1(c′, c′)−G(c, c′), pi2(c′, c′) +G(c, c′)− F pi(c, c), pi(c, c)
where in both tables, the strategies of firm 1 and firm 2 are labeled vertically and
horizontally. For every payoff vector, the first and second expressions represent the
net equilibrium payoff of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.
Thus, from Table 3.1, we know that the non-strategic and strategic incentives
for R&D under no patent protection with licensing for each firm are N(NP ) =
pi(c′, c′) − pi(c, c) + G(c′, c˜) − F and S(NP ) = pi(c′, c′) − pi(c˜, c′) − F . Meanwhile,
2
Table 4.1 yields the non-strategic and strategic incentives for R&D under patent
protection with licensing for each firm as N(L) = pi(c′, c′) − pi(c, c) + G(c′, c) − F
and S(L) = G(c′, c)− F . A direct comparison between S(L) and S(NP ), and the
optimal licensing fixed-fee give:
S(L)− S(NP ) = pi1(c˜, c′)− pi1(c, c′) > 0. (3)
Similarly, the comparison between N(L) and N(NP ) gives:
N(L)−N(NP ) = G(c′, c)−G(c′, c˜) = pi1(c′, c˜)− pi1(c, c′) > 0 (4)
This result implies that fixed-fee licensing also generates higher R&D investment,
and it then completes the proof with the effect of royalty licensing in MU.
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